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NOTIFICATION OF BREACH UNDER UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 2-607(3)(a): A
CONFLICT, A RESOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
Section 2-607(3)(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code requires
that "[w]here a tender has been accepted ... the buyer must within
a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any
breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy."'
This section bars a suit 2 for breach of warranty if the buyer has not
met the notification requirement.3 The Code does not prescribe
I U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1977).
2 The literal language of § 2-607(3)(a) bars any "buyer" from pursuing remedies
for breach if he has not satisfied § 2-607(3)(a)'s notification requirement. The bar cer-
tainly applies to merchants. See K&M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106,
1115-16 (6th Cir. 1982); infra text accompanying note 115; see also Standard Alliance
Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 827 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923
(1979); Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 977 (5th Cir.
1976). Some courts, however, have held that the Code does not require consumers to
give notification within a reasonable time or that it imposes a more relaxed standard on
consumers than on merchants. See Clark, The First Line of Defense in Warranty Suits: Failure
to Give Notice of Breach, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 105, 115-16 (1982) (citing cases). This Note exam-
ines only the standard applicable to merchants.
For an analysis of the notification requirement in breach of warranty and strict tort
liability, as applied to both consumers and merchants, see generally Phillips, Notice of
Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Liability Law: Should There Be a Difference?, 47 IND. LJ. 457
(1972); Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 363 (1979) (notice requirement in warranty cases as applied
to both consumers and merchants).
3 A buyer's failure to give any form of notification gives rise to an absolute bar to
any remedy the buyer might otherwise seek for breach. U.C.C. § 607(3)(a) (1977); see,
e.g., Klockner Inc. v. Federal Wire Mill Corp., 663 F.2d 1370, 1378-79 (7th Cir. 1981)
(failure to notify seller of defects in steel rods barred buyer's suit); Point Adams Packing
Co. v. Astoria Marine Constr. Co., 594 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1979) (failure to notify barred
buyer's recovery in action for damages caused by failure to supply state of the art safety
devices on fishing vessel). See generally Clark, supra note 2, at 106-10, 113-14 (discussing
impact of § 2-607(3)(a)). This is true even where the lack of notification does not preju-
dice the seller. Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 511
(Alaska 1980) ("On its face the language of [2-607(3)(a)] allows for no alternative to
timely notice . . . It provides for no excuse from notice such as lack of prejudice.").
Other issues associated with § 2-607(3)(a) are well settled. Section 2-607(3)(a) ap-
plies only after a buyer accepts the seller's tender of goods. In Roth Steel Prods. v.
Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983), the court noted that "[§] 2-607(3)(a)
by its own terms applies only when tendered goods have been accepted. . . . Thus,
[buyers are] under no obligation to give notice of breach with regard to . ..goods
which [are] never delivered and, thus, [are] never accepted by the [buyer]." Id. at 152
n.40.
A buyer claiming breach must affirmatively plead and prove that he gave the notifi-
cation required by § 2-607(3)(a). Roth Steel Prods., 705 F.2d at 153; see also K&M Joint
Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1111 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff buyer must
prove adequate notice); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813,
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any form of notification;4 a buyer may meet its requirements by giv-
ing notification either orally5 or in writing. Although at least one
court has noted that the pleadings themselves may constitute notifi-
cation, even when both parties are merchants, 6 the majority view
requires the buyer to give notification prior to filing suit.7 The ab-
823 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[I]nasmuch as section 2-607 operates as a condition precedent to
any recovery, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that notice was given within
a reasonable time."), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 970 n.31 (5th Cir. 1976) (buyer must both plead and
prove notice); Steel & Wire Corp. v. Thyssen, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 892, 895
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (buyer must both plead and prove notice "as a prerequisite of recov-
ery"); L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 563,469, 438 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1969)
(buyer must plead and prove notification as condition precedent to recovery); 4 R. AN-
DERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607:19, at 30 (3d ed. 1983) (notification is
condition precedent to recovery); 3 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES
§ 2-607:07, at 70 (1982) (burden of proof on buyer to show notification was given).
This pleading requirement is not particularly strict. One court has held that a plain-
tiff successfully pleads notification when his pleadings make the issue "apparent." Paul-
son v. Olson Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 521, 319 N.W.2d 855, 860 (1982)
(modern rules of pleading eliminate merely technical rigor).
Whether adequate notification was given is a question of fact. E.g., Royal Type-
writer Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1102 (11th Cir. 1983) ("issues
of timeliness and sufficiency are questions of fact"); Carter Equip. Co. v. John Deere
Indus. Equip., 681 F.2d 386, 396 (5th Cir. 1982) (determination of adequacy of notifica-
tion is jury question); Standard Alliance Indus., 587 F.2d at 823 ("[w]hether proper notice
was given is a question of fact"); Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 970-73 (usually question of
fact); 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-607:11, at 124-25 (same); 3 W. HAWKLAND, supra
note 3, § 607:07, at 70 (same). But see K&MJoint Venture, 669 F.2d at 1111 ("[T]he
question of whether any notice was given, and if so, what the notice consisted of and
when it was given is one of fact. However, the question of whether the notice satisfied
the statutory requirement is one of the law.").
4 Hoffman's Double Bar Pine Nursery v. Fyke, 633 P.2d 516, 518 (Colo. Ct. App.
198 1); see also 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-607:32, at 139. The parties to a contract,
however, may modify the requirements of § 2-607(3)(a) to require written notification.
See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1977); see also Prompt Elec. Supply. Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 492
F. Supp. 344, 347-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-607:3, at 119; cf
U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978) (definition of agreement).
5 Professors White and Summers note:
The law seems well established now that oral notification satisfies the
notice requirement of 2-607(3)(a). Section 2-607(3)(a) uses the verb
"notify;" that word is defined in 1-201(2) in a way that permits an oral
statement to constitute notice. That other Code sections impose writing
requirements by using the word "sent" supports this interpretation of 2-
607(3)(a).
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-10, at 425-26 (2d ed. 1980)
(footnotes omitted); see also 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-607:35, at 141; 3 W. HAWK-
LAND, supra note 3, § 2-607:07, at 67; infra note 63. The parol evidence rule does not
bar admission of evidence to show that oral notification was given. International Paper
Co. v. Margrove, Inc., 75 Misc. 2d 763, 765-66, 348 N.Y.S.2d 916, 919 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
6 Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 274, 560 P.2d 789, 792 (1977) (dicta)
(based on cases decided under Uniform Sales Act); cf. Hampton v. Gebhardt's Chili Pow-
der Co., 294 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1961) (notice need not precede filing of original com-
plaint but may follow commencement of suit provided it is subsequently pleaded).
7 In rejecting the view that the pleadings may fulfill the requirements of § 2-
607(3)(a), the Maryland Supreme Court reasoned that
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sence of specific guidelines in section 2-607(3)(a) has forced the
courts to develop standards for determining what constitutes ade-
quate notification. Some courts have held that virtually any com-
plaint will satisfy the requirement,8 but others require the buyer to
notify the seller that he considers the seller to be legally in breach.9
This Note first explores the development and application of
these two standards.' 0 It then evaluates the standards with respect
to the policies underlying the notification requirement and argues
that neither standard adequately furthers these policies."I The Note
then develops an analytical process for evaluating notification under
section 2-607(3)(a).1 2 Finally, the Note analyzes a series of hy-
potheticals to illustrate the usefulness of this process. 13
I
THE STANDARD OF NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 2-
607(3)(a): THE Two CONTEMPORARY
STANDARDS
A. Origins of the Standard of Notification Debate
Section 2-607(3)(a) requires the buyer to "notify" the seller of
[s]ince the existence of a right of action is conditioned upon whether
notification has been given the seller by the buyer, where no notice has
been given prior to the institution of the action an essential condition
precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyer-
plaintiff has lost the right of his "remedy." Thus the institution of an
action by the buyer to recover damages cannot by itself be regarded as a
notice of the breach contemplated under [§ 2-607(3)(a)].
Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 17, 327 A.2d 502, 514 (1974). This view
is better than that advanced by the court in Pace, 114 Ariz. at 274, 560 P.2d at 792,
because, were a court "to conclude that a complaint serves as notice [, it] would defeat
one of the primary purposes of the notice requirement-settlement of claims and avoid-
ance of litigation." Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507,
513 (Alaska 1980); accord Voboril v. Namco Leisure World, Inc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 614, 615 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978) (allowing pleadings to constitute notice
would defeat purposes of requirement); see also infra notes 90-91, 119-25 and accompa-
nying text (discussing policy of settlement underlying § 2-607(3) (a)).
8 See infra section I.B.
9 See infra section I.C.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 14-86.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 87-126.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 127-34. The major developments this Note
discusses all occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. For an extensive discussion of earlier
decisions and the historical background of § 2-607(3) (a), see Note, Notice of Breach and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 520 (1973).
This Note does not deal with two other issues presented by § 2-607(3)(a). These
are whether a particular notification was given within a reasonable time and whether a
buyer must give notification to a remote seller. For a discussion of these issues, see 3 W.
HAWKLAND, supra note 3, §§ 2-607:5, 2-607:06; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5,
§ 11-10; Clark, supra note 2, at 125-38.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 135-57.
1985]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
any "breach." 14 The Code does not define "breach." Moreover, its
definitions of "notify" and "notice" do not indicate how specific a
buyer's communication to a seller must be in order to meet section
2-607(3)(a)'s notification requirement. The definition of "notify" in
section 1-201(26) merely states that "[a] person 'notifies' or 'gives' a
notice or notification to another by taking such steps as may be rea-
sonably required to inform the other in ordinary course whether or
not such other actually comes to know of it."' 15 Section 1-201(25),
which defines "notice," simply states that:
A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time
in question he has reason to know that it exists. 16
The Code's lack of satisfactory definitions for these terms has
allowed courts to develop two interpretations of section 2-
607(3)(a)'s notification requirement. Some courts argue that the
drafters of section 2-607(3)(a) used the word "breach" to hold the
buyer to a strict standard of notice. Under this standard, some
courts require the buyer to notify the seller of his intent to hold the
seller legally responsible for a nonconforming tender, while others re-
quire only notification that the buyer considers the seller to be le-
gally in breach. 17 Courts employing the second interpretation of
section 2-607(3) (a) argue that the drafters established a lenient stan-
dard of notification. Courts following this approach require the
buyer to notify the seller that he has made a nonconforming tender,
but do not require the notification to indicate whether the buyer
intends to seek legal redress.' 8
The drafters of the Code attempted to clarify the notification
requirements of section 2-607(3) (a) in official comment four to that
section. 19 The comment only creates ambiguity, however, seeming
to endorse the lenient standard at one point and the strict standard
at another. 20 The second paragraph of the comment provides that
"[t]he content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the
seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched." 21 This language supports the lenient standard of notifi-
cation in that virtually any indication of unhappiness by the buyer
14 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1977).
15 Id. § 1-201(26).
16 Id. § 1-201(25).
17 See infra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text.
19 Id. § 2-607(3)(a) official comment 4.
20 See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-607: 43, at 147.
21 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) official comment 4 (1977).
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should inform the seller that the transaction is still troublesome. 22
In a statement later in the comment, however, the drafters ap-
pear to adopt the strict standard of notification: "The notification
which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need only be such
as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach
.... ,23 Thus, rather than clarifying the meaning of the statutory
language, the comment can serve to support either reading.
The history of section 2-607(3) (a) provides some guidance as to
the drafters' intent. The drafters derived section 2-607(3)(a) from
section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act.24 This section stated: "But, if,
after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail to give notice to the
seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable
time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such breach, the
seller shall not be liable therefor. ' '25 Most courts26 construed sec-
tion 49 to require the buyer to give the seller express notice of his
intent to seek legal redress for specified damages. 27 This require-
ment led to decisions with harsh results for consumers who failed to
comply with the purely technical requirements of section 49.28 In
22 SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-10, at 425; see also 3 W. HAWKLAND,
supra note 3, § 2-607:07, at 67 (need only state that there are problems).
23 U.G.C. § 2-607(3)(a) official comment 4 (1977) (emphasis added).
24 Id. § 2-607(3)(a) official comment (prior statutory provisions); see Note, supra
note 12, at 521.
25 Unif. Sales Act. § 49, 1A U.L.A. 99 (1950).
26 See Clarizo v. Spada Distrib. Co., 291 Or. 516, 524-27, 373 P.2d 689, 693-94
(1962).
27 See S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES § 484b, at 42 (rev. ed. 1948) ("[Notice
under § 49] should fairly advise the seller of the defect asserted in the performance of a
particular promise or sale; it should repel any inference of waiver, and at least by impli-
cation should assert that there has been a violation of the buyer's legal rights."); see, e.g.,
Whitfield v.Jessup, 39 Cal. 2d 826, 830, 193 P.2d 1, 4 (1948) (notice must inform "seller
that the buyer intends to look to him for damages"); Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App.
2d 837, 840-41, 314 P.2d 130, 133 (1957) (notice that hair dye burned plaintiff's scalp
insufficient because did not state intent to bring legal action); Dailey v. Holiday Distrib.
Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 873, 151 N.W.2d 477, 487 (1967) ("Ordinarily this notice must be
more than a mere complaint. It shall directly or inferentially inform the other party or
parties the buyer or bailee claims breach. . . and damages are demanded."); Idzykowski
v. Jordan Marsh Co., 279 Mass. 163, 167-68, 181 N.E. 172, 173 (1932) (must specify
with reasonable particularity what constitutes breach); Clarizo v. Spada Distrib. Co., 231
Or. 516, 524, 373 P.2d 689, 693-94 (1962) (must notify seller that "he intends to claim
damages"); see also Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 976
(5th Cir. 1976) (same); Note, supra note 12, at 536 ("To meet the requirements, the
notice must have apprised the seller that he was to be held liable for damages, that the
legal rights of the purchaser have [sic] been violated, or must have eliminated any refer-
ence that there was a waiver of remedies.") (footnotes omitted).
28 See Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 976 ("These technical requirements [of § 49]
...frequently served to deny an uninformed consumer of what was otherwise a valid
claim."); see, e.g., Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal.App. 2d 837, 840-41, 314 P.2d 130, 133
(1957) (complaint of rash caused by seller's hair dye insufficient notice); Idzykowski, 279
Mass. at 167-68, 181 N.E. at 173 (complaint of burns caused by seller's shoe polish
insufficient notice).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
an effort to reduce the possibility that courts would bar meritorious
consumer suits on technical grounds, the drafters of comment four
to section 2-607(3)(a) eliminated the requirement that the buyer
give the seller express notice of his intent to seek legal remedies for
specified damages. 29
Although this history demonstrates the drafters' intent to reject
the requirement of express notice regarding the buyer's plan to seek
legal remedies for specified instances of breach, contradictory lan-
guage in comment four remains. The uncertainty concerning the
proper interpretation of this comment has contributed to the disa-
greement concerning the standard of notification required by sec-
tion 2-607(3) (a).30
B. The Lenient Standard of Notification
Courts adopting the lenient standard require a buyer to notify
the seller that "the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched." 3 1 These courts do not require the buyer to notify the
seller that he intends to seek legal redress for a breach. 32 Virtually
29 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) official comment 4 (1977) ("the rule of requiring notifica-
tion is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of
his remedy"); see also Eastern Air Lines,'532 F.2d at 1976.
30 One commentator has recently noted the confusion caused by the ambiguity in
comment four.
Some courts have given the notice requirements a stricter applica-
tion than indicated by the Official Code Comment and require the buyer
to declare that he regards the seller as guilty of breach of the contract.
This view is supported by the rationale that the underlying purpose of
notice is to inform the other party so that he can take steps to remedy the
condition or give the buyer additional instructions as to the use of the
goods.
The confusion in this area probably arises from the ambiguous state-
ment in the Official Code Comment requiring the buyer to inform the
seller "that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach."
4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-607:43, at 147 (footnotes omitted). See also Speakman
Co. v. Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 583 F. Supp. 273, 277 n.4 (noting recent development
of strict standard).
31 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) official comment 4 (1977).
32 For applications of the lenient standard, see, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xero-
graphic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 110.2 (11 th Cir. 1983) (complaints sufficient if
reasonable jury could infer that they notified the seller that the transaction was trouble-
some); Continental Forest Prods. v. V.S. & Bros. Ltd. Partnership, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1578, 1579 (9th Cir. 1982) (request that seller "fulfill. . .all orders" suffi-
cient notification that transaction was troublesome) (unreported); Wilson v. Marquette
Elec., Inc., 630 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1980) (complaints that computer was not working
properly); Alafoss v. Premium Corp. of Am., 599 F.2d 232, 235 (8th Cir. 1979) (com-
plaint that fur collars on coats turned yellow and ragged); AES Technology Syss., Inc. v.
Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 937-38 (7th Cir. 1978) (phone call from buyer ex-
pressing unhappiness with laser's performance); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 957
(8th Cir. 1974) (letter stating that bowling pin spotters were not installed and needed
repairs); Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 1509 (8th Cir. 1971) (expression of
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any complaint from the buyer to the seller suffices to meet this
standard.33
Oregon Lumber Co. v. Dwyer Overseas Timber Products Co.34 illus-
trates the application of the lenient standard. In Oregon Lumber, the
buyer purchased timber of a particular grade from the seller. The
buyer informed the seller on several occasions that the lumber was
below grade. The buyer continued to accept delivery, however, and
made several payments before refusing to pay the balance due on
the contract. The court found that the buyer's early complaints met
the requirements of section 2-607(3)(a).3 5 Applying the lenient
doubt to seller that oil supplied was appropriate for use in machine); Boeing Airplane
Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 594-96 (8th Cir. 1964) (statements that helicopter failed
to lift promised amount of load); Kirby v. Chrysler Corp., 554 F. Supp. 743, 752 (D. Md.
1982) (complaints that manufacturer was delivering vehicles in violation of contract);
Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77, 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (com-
plaint that machine was not functioning properly); Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 551 F.
Supp. 771, 780 (D.S.D. 1982) (complaints that aircraft engine was not functioning prop-
erly); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 375 (E.D.
Mich. 1977) (expression of dissatisfaction with performance of automated machine and
need for service calls); General Instrument Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc.,
366 F. Supp. 139, 147 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (oral notice of oil on bomb fuse sleeves), affd
without opinion sub nom. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc. v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 506
F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974); Chemco Indus. Applicators v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
366 F. Supp. 278, 286 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (complaint to seller's agent that "vegetation was
beginning to bud again" after buyer sprayed with defoliant manufactured by seller);
Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522, 529 (D.D.C. 1971)
(complaint that carbon dioxide for soft drinks smelled like rotten eggs); Hoffman's
Double Bar Pine Nursery v. Fyke, 633 P.2d 516, 519 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (notation on
purchase order that tree roots were improperly wrapped); Stelco Indus. v. Cohen, 182
Conn. 561, 565-66, 438 A.2d 759, 761-62 (1980) (repeated oral complaints about defec-
tive building materials); Crest Container Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co., 111 111. App. 3d
1068, 445 N.E.2d 19 (1982) (observation of malfunction by seller's agent combined with
past requests for service by buyer); Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 170 Ind. App. 84, 94, 352
N.E.2d 774, 781 (1976) (complaint that car wash brush was working improperly);
Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 99 N.M. 253, 257, 657 P.2d 109, 113 (1982) (com-
plaints that dump truck parts were defective); International Paper Co. v. Margrove, Inc.,
75 Misc. 2d 763, 766, 348 N.Y.S.2d 916, 919 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (oral complaint that seller
sent a "bad shipment of paper" sufficient to defeat summaryjudgment motion); Oregon
Lumber Co. v. Dwyer Overseas Timber Prods. Co., 280 Or. 437, 442-43, 571 P.2d 884,
887 (1977) (claim that timber was below grade); R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement
Prods. Corp., 232 Pa. Super. 242, 258, 336 A.2d 397, 404 (1975) (expressions of"dis-
satisfactions" with concrete blocks), afd on other grounds, 474 Pa. 199, 378 A.2d 288
(1977); Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496, 503 (S.D. 1977) (letter detailing de-
fects, all repaired by seller, sufficient to notify of defects not detailed in letter); Paulson
v. Olson Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d*510, 522-23, 319 N.W.2d 855, 860 (1982) (notice
that grain drying equipment not performing as expected).
33 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-10, at 425 ("[A] letter containing
anything but the most exaggerated encomiums would seem to tell that the transaction 'is
still troublesome and must be watched.' " Similar oral notification would also suffice.).
34 280 Or. 437, 571 P.2d 884 (1977). The seller initiated this action to recover the
balance due under the sales contract. The buyer counterclaimed, contending it was enti-
fled to partial recovery of money already paid on the contract.
35 Id. at 443, 571 P.2d at 887.,
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standard of notification, the court held that -[t]he notice may be
given in any manner or form sufficient to apprise the seller that
there are problems with the transaction." 3 6 The court concluded
that the buyer need not assert his "intention to make a claim for
damages or pursue any other remedy" 37 when he notifies the seller
of the problem with the transaction.
In cases like Oregon Lumber, 38 the number of complaints a buyer
makes may lead the seller to infer that the buyer is contemplating a
law suit. A buyer need not make numerous complaints to satisfy the
lenient standard, however. A single complaint concerning the qual-
ity or performance of a product is sufficient.39
36 Id. at 442, 571 P.2d at 887 (citations omitted).
37 Id. (citations omitted).
39 Id. at 437, 571 P.2d at 884; see also, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic
Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1102 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (numerous complaints concerning
copiers); Wilson v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 630 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1980) (complaints that
computer was not working properly); AES Technology Syss., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation,
538 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978) (complaints expressing unhappiness with laser's perform-
ance); Lewis v. Mobil Oil Co., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971) (expressions of doubt to
seller that oil supplied was appropriate for use in buyer's machine); Boeing Airplane Co.
v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 595-96 (8th Cir. 1964) (repeated oral and written complaints
that helicopter failed to lift promised load); Kirby v. Chrysler Corp., 554 F. Supp. 743
(D. Mass. 1982) (complaints by car dealer that manufacturer was delivering vehicles in
violation of contract); Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 551 F. Supp. 771 (D.S.D. 1982)
(complaints that aircraft engine was not functioning properly), modified on other grounds,
714 F.2d 862 (8th Cir. 1983); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428
F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (expression of dissatisfaction with automated machine
and need for service calls); Stelco Indus. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 438 A.2d 759 (1980)
(repeated oral complaints); Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 170 Ind. App. 84, 352 N.E.2d 774
(1976) (repeated complaints that car washing equipment worked improperly); Deaton,
Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 99 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 109 (1982) (complaints that dumptruck
parts were defective); R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods., 232 Pa. Super. 242,
336 A.2d 397 (1975) (oral expressions of "dissatisfactions" with concrete blocks), aj'd
on other grounds, 474 Pa. 299, 378 A.2d 288 (1977); Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 107
Wis. 2d 510, 319 N.W.2d 855 (1982) (requests for many service calls).
39 Virtually any written notification will satisfy the lenient standard. See, e.g., Conti-
nental Forest Prods. v. V.S. & Bros. Ltd. Partnership, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1578, 1579 (9th Cir. 1982) (unreported) (buyer's request that seller "fulfill . . . all or-
ders" sufficient to notify seller that transaction was "troublesome"); Bonebrake v. Cox,
499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) (letter stating that bowling pinspotters not installed and
needed repairs); Hoffman's Double Bar Pine Nursery v. Fyke, 633 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (notation on purchase order that tree roots wrapped improperly); see also J.
WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-10, at 425-26 (virtually any writing satisfac-
tory). Most single oral complaints will also satisfy the lenient standard. See, e.g., General
Instrument Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 139 (M.D. Pa.
1973) (oral notice of oil on bomb fuse sleeves), aff'd without opinion sub nom., Pennsylvania
Pressed Metals, Inc. v. Tenneco Chem., Inc, 506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974); Chemco
Indus. Applicators v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 F. Supp. 278, 286 (E.D. Mo.
1973) (oral complaint to seller's agent that "vegetation was beginning to bud again"
after buyer sprayed with defoliant manufactured by seller); International Paper Co. v.
Margrove, Inc., 75 Misc. 763, 766, 384 N.Y.S.2d 916, 919 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (oral com-
plaint that seller sent buyer "a bad shipment of paper" sufficient to overcome motion
for summary judgment).
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Several courts applying the lenient standard have not even re-
quired direct communication between the parties. Courts have
found sufficient notification where the buyer returned the goods, 40
or the seller's agent saw a machine malfunction. 4' One court found
that a letter listing defects later repaired by the seller was sufficient
to notify the seller of the defects not detailed in the letter.42 These
courts may rely on the theory that the notification given was suffi-
cient to put the seller on inquiry notice. 43
A few courts applying the lenient standard have held that a
buyer need not notify the seller of a breach in late delivery cases. 44
InJay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc.,45 the seller breached by
delivering goods late under a contract making time of the essence.
The court sustained the buyer's suit for damages, holding that noti-
fication of breach was not required in late delivery cases.46 The
court based its holding on its view of the purpose of section 2-
607(3)(a)'s notification requirement: "to inform the seller of matters
which would not normally come to the buyer's attention until after
the goods came into his possession." 47 The court reasoned that
both parties know that a breach has occurred in late delivery cases.
Thus, it is unnecessary for the buyer to notify the seller in order to
inform him of the breach.48 TheJay V Zimmerman court held in the
alternative that even if section 2-607(3)(a) requires notification in
late delivery cases, the buyer had given the seller adequate notice by
sending a letter stating that the seller had missed the delivery date
by a "wide margin."49
40 Hoffman's Double Bar Pine Nursery, 633 P.2d at 519.
41 Crest Container Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co., 111 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1077, 445
N.E.2d 19, 25-26 (1982) (observation of malfunction by seller's agent combined with
past requests for service).
42 Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496, 503 (S.D. 1977).
43 See Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522, 528-29
(D.D.C. 1971) (complaint that carbon dioxide for soft drinks smelled like "rotten eggs"
sufficient to alert seller that it should inquire further); Stelco Indus. v. Cohen, 182 Conn.
561, 566, 438 A.2d 759, 761-62 (1980) (oral notification "sufficient to alert [seller] to
the possibility that it might be answerable to [buyer] for breach of... warranty"); 2 R.
ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607:34, at 223 (2d ed. 1971) (arguing that
"[w]here the notice as given is sufficient to lead the seller to the defects in the goods, the
fact that the notice does not set forth all the facts is not material").
44 See Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 254 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (notification not required where seller did not deliver adequate quantities of liq-
uid oxygen in timely manner), affd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975); Jay V.
Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Mo. 1971); cf. Mac-
Gregor v. McReki, Inc., 30 Colo. App. 196, 201-02, 494 P.2d 1297, 1299 (1971) (notifi-
cation given prior to delivery that buyer would consider any late delivery to be breach).
45 327 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
46 Id. at 1204.
47 Id. (emphasis in original).
48 Id.
49 See id.
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Courts applying the lenient standard require, therefore, only
that the buyer inform the seller that a transaction is troublesome
when the seller would not recognize the trouble absent notification.
C. The Strict Standard of Notification
Courts adopting the strict standard require a more specific noti-
fication. One court applying the strict standard has held that notice
"must be more than a complaint. It must, either directly or inferen-
tially, inform the seller that the buyer demands damages upon an
asserted claim of breach of warranty." 50 Although not all courts
employing the strict standard require notification of an intended
legal action, they all reject the view that mere notification that the
transaction is "troublesome" satisfies section 2-607(3)(a). 51
Although they agree that the notification need not contain specific
legal claims or theories, it must inform the seller that the buyer con-
siders the seller to be in breach.52 Most courts using the strict stan-
dard look at the entire course of communication between the parties
to determine whether the buyer gave adequate notification of
breach.55
The leading case adopting the strict standard, Eastern Airlines v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 54 demonstrates the stringency of that stan-
dard. 55 Eastern purchased DC-8 jet aircraft from Douglas for deliv-
ery in set intervals. After Douglas fell behind in its deliveries,
Eastern indicated that it considered Douglas to be in breach. East-
50 Cotner v. International Harvester Co., 260 Ark. 885, 889, 545 S.W.2d 627, 630
(1977); see also Atlantic Bldg. Syss., Inc. v. Alley Constr. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1414, 1420 (D. Mass. 1981) (citing Cotner and holding letter requesting
credit for replacement parts allegedly missing from original shipment to be inadequate
notice).
51 See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Co., 705 F.2d 134, 153 (6th Cir. 1983);
K&M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1112-13 (6th Cir. 1982); T.J.
Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1980); Stan-
dard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 825 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 923 (1979); Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 972
(5th Cir. 1976); United Cal. Bank v. Eastern Mountain Sports, 546 F. Supp. 945, 958 (D.
Mass. 1982); Atlantic Bldg. Syss. Inc., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1420; Cotner, 260
Ark. at 889, 545 S.W.2d at 630.
52 Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 976.
53 See id. at 978; see also K&MJoint Venture, 669 F.2d at 1114-15 (buyer's conduct did
not indicate that it considered seller in breach); Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake
Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 97 (E.D. Tenn. 1971) (buyer led seller to believe that seller
not considered in breach). This examination operates as a policing mechanism to pre-
vent behavior by the buyer that might mislead the seller to believe that the buyer did not
consider him to be in breach. See infra section II.A.
54 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
55 Prior to Eastern Air Lines, some courts applied the strict standard. See, e.g., Lynx,
Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 18, 327 A.2d 502, 514 (1974) (notice saying
" 'cash flow has been severely interrupted in the last 60 days, due in part to a quality
problem'" was "equivocal" and constituted insufficient notice).
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ern's behavior subsequent to the notification, however, indicated its
willingness to accept late deliveries. 56 The district court, relying in
part on Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 57 held that section
2-607(3)(a) did not apply to late delivery cases. 58 The Fifth Circuit
reversed, reasoning that " '[t]he purpose of the notice is to advise
the seller that he must meet a claim for damages.'-59 This broad
view of the notification requirement's purpose caused the court to
conclude that a buyer must notify the seller of breach even in late
delivery cases. 60
Turning to the issue of whether Eastern gave Douglas adequate
notification of breach, the Eastern Air Lines court held that section 2-
607(3)(a) requires the notification to inform the seller "that the
transaction is claimed to involve a breach. ' 61 The court decided
that Eastern could not prevail on its motion for summary judgment
because it could not prove as a matter of law that it had given Doug-
las such notification. The court reasoned that by indicating its will-
ingness to accept late deliveries, Eastern may have led Douglas to
56 Eastern's communications to Douglas could "reasonably be construed as an ef-
fort to prod McDonnell Douglas . . . rather than as a claim for breach." Eastern Air
Lines, 532 F.2d at 978. Additionally, the Eastern Air Lines court noted that
Eastern's commercial good faith is subject to further challenge because it
continued to negotiate new contracts and amend old ones throughout the
period in which the delays occurred. . . . At no time during the negotia-
tion and execution of any of these contracts did Eastern seek a settlement
of its claims or even dispute McDonnell's Vietnam excuse. This may very
well have led McDonnell to believe that, even though Eastern was un-
happy about the delays, it did not consider them to be a breach of the
contract.
Id. at 979 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, some testimony indicated that Eastern's
management had assured Douglas that Eastern would not hold Douglas in breach. Id.
57 327 F. Supp. 1198, 1204 (E.D. Mo. 1971); see supra notes 45-49 and accompany-
ing text.
58 Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 970-71.
59 Id. at 972 (quoting American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. E.F. Corp.,
7 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand, J.)).
60 Id. at 971-73. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on the deci-
sional history under § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act. See supra notes 24-29 and accompa-
nying text. Saying that "section 2-607 continues the basic policies underlying section 49
of the Uniform Sales Act," 532 F.2d at 972 (footnote omitted), the court rejected theJay
V Zimmerman court's analysis by quoting Justice Learned Hand's interpretation of § 49
in a late delivery case:
The plaintiff replies that the buyer is not required to give notice of
what the seller already knows, but this confuses two quite different
things. The notice "of the breach" required is not of the facts, which the
seller presumably knows quite as well as, if not better than, the buyer, but
of buyer's claim that they constitute a breach. The purpose of the notice
is to advise the seller that he must meet a claim for damages, as to which,
rightly or wrongly, the law requires that he shall have early warning.
532 F.2d at 972 (quoting American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. E.F. Corp., 7
F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand, J.)).
61 Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 978 (footnote omitted).
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believe that it did not intend to take legal action because of the late
deliveries. 62 The Eastern Air Lines court remanded the case with in-
structions that a jury determine "whether Eastern's conduct
throughout the life of the contracts constituted adequate and timely
notice to McDonnell [Douglas] that it was considered to be in
breach of the contracts." 63
The Sixth Circuit, in Standard Alliance Industries v. Black Clawson
Co., 6 4 endorsed the Eastern Air Lines view in a case involving a breach
of a warranty of quality.65 In Standard Alliance, the seller sold a
62 Id. at 979. The Eastern Air Lines court may have been motivated to reject the
lenient standard and to adopt the strict standard out of a belief that the lenient standard
would be ineffective in preventing misleading behavior. See generally id. at 977-80 (dis-
cussing Eastern's possibly misleading behavior). Cases citing Eastern Air Lines have, how-
ever, interpreted it doctrinally, applying the strict standard to any case. See Roth Steel
Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 152-53 (6th Cir. 1983); K&MJoint Venture
v. Smith Int'l Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1112-13 (6th Cir. 1982); T.J. Stevenson v. 81,193
Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 360 (5th Cir. 1980).
63 Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 980. As this result demonstrates, a court using the
strict standard evaluates whether a buyer has given adequate notification by examining
the buyer's actions when "taken as a whole." It is therefore possible that "[e]ven though
adequate notice may have been given at one point in the transaction, subsequent actions
by the buyer may have dissipated its effect." Id. at 978; see also K&MJoint Venture, 669
F.2d at 1114-15 (fact that machine buyer continued ordering repair and replacement
parts for machine from seller and paid for them without protest prevented complaints
that machine malfunctioned from constituting notification of breach); Kopper Glo Fuel,
Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 97 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (buyer's "entire
course of conduct led [seller] to believe that it was not considered to be in breach"). As
with the lenient standard, notification may be either written or oral. See T.J. Stevenson &
Co., 629 F.2d at 359.
In Roth Steel Prods., a more recent late delivery case, the court reaffirmed the applica-
tion of the strict standard. The court reasoned that "non-conforming" performance is
often equivocal. 705 F.2d at 152 (also stating that § 2-607(3)(a) plainly requires notifi-
cation of any breach by its express terms). One commentator explains:
Notice is required where the breach is delay of the time of perform-
ance by the seller. It might be urged that the seller needs no notice in the
case of delivery delayed beyond a date expressly fixed in the contract, for
he must be aware that he is violating the provisions of the contract, but
though he knows this, he does not know whether the buyer is willing to
accept deferred delivery as full satisfaction, and in any event, the words of
the statute are plain.
2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 43 § 2-607:13, at 211 (footnote omitted).
64 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
65 The strict standard may now be the majority view in both breach of warranty of
quality and late delivery cases. T.J. Stevenson, 629 F.2d at 360; see, e.g., K&MJoint Venture,
669 F.2d at 1106 (notification insufficient when machine buyer continued ordering and
paying for repair and replacement parts for machine without protest); Southern Ill.
Stone Co. v. Universal Eng'g Corp., 592 F.2d 446, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1979) (concluding
that Illinois has adopted the Eastern Air Lines standard); Atlantic Bldg. Syss., Inc. v. Alley
Constr. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1414, 1420 (D. Mass. 1981) (letter re-
questing credit for missing parts inadequate to notify seller of breach); Clow Corp. v.
Metro Pipeline Co., 442 F. Supp. 5833, 589-90 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (two telephone conver-
sations discussing "unusual erosions of certain pieces of pipe" inadequate notification);
Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc., 436 F. Supp. at 97 (buyer's "entire course of conduct led [seller] to
believe that it was not considered to be in breach"); Cotner v. International Harvester
[Vol. 70:525
NOTIFICATION OF BREACH
machine for the manufacture of railcar axles, The machine was
poorly engineered and continually malfunctioned. The seller re-
peatedly tried to repair the machine and eventually thought that the
buyer was satisfied with the repairs. The buyer then brought suit,
alleging a breach of the seller's warranty of the machine. The Sixth
Circuit held that section 2-607(3)(a) barred the buyer's claim. The
court found that the buyer did not notify the seller that the repairs
were ineffective or that the buyer considered the seller to be in
breach. The court, citing the language of section 2-607(3)(a), held
that the buyer must give the seller notification of "any" breach. 66
In summary, courts adopting the strict standard require, at a
minimum, that the buyer notify the seller, either directly or inferen-
tially, that he considers the seller to be in breach. Courts adopting
the lenient standard merely require the buyer to notify the seller
that the transaction is troublesome.
D. The Differences in Effect of the Lenient Standard and the
Strict Standard When Applied to the Facts of Similar
Cases
Several courts have decided cases with similar fact patterns but
have reached different conclusions because they applied different
standards of notification. An examination of these cases illustrates
the practical implications of the standard of notice debate.
1. Late Delivery Cases
Courts disagree as to whether a buyer must give the seller noti-
fication of breach when the seller fails to deliver goods in a timely
manner. Courts applying the lenient standard do not require the
buyer to give notification of breach in late delivery cases. 67 These
courts reason that the purpose of the notification requirement is to
inform the seller of the "troublesome" nature of the transaction
when he would not otherwise know of the problems. 68 A reasonable
seller who fails to make deliveries in a timely manner should realize
Co., 260 Ark. 885, 889, 545 S.W.2d 627, 630 (1977) (buyer's oral complaints to truck
salesmen and repairmen inadequate); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1,
18, 327 A.2d 502, 514 (1974) (notice saying "cash flow has been severely interrupted in
the last 60 days, due in part to a quality problem' " was "equivocal" and constituted
insufficient notification); Michigan Sugar Co. v. Jebavy-Sorenson Orchard Co., 66 Mich.
App. 642, 647, 239 N.W.2d 693, 696 (1976) (notification from buyer to seller that 68
bags of sugar were defective insufficient to notify seller that other bags in shipment were
defective). But cf. Clark, supra note 2, at 123 (Eastern Air Lines "seems to run counter to
the great tide of cases holding that general statements of dissatisfaction are sufficient.").
66 Standard Alliance Indus., 587 F.2d at 825.
67 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
68 E.g., Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198, 1204 (E.D.
Mo. 1971).
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that the transaction is troublesome without notification. 69 There-
fore, these courts do not require the buyer to notify the seller of the
later delivery.
Courts using the strict standard, however, require the buyer to
notify the seller of breach in late delivery cases. 70 They reason that
the purpose of the notification requirement " 'is to advise the seller
that he must meet a claim for damages, as to which, rightly or
wrongly, the law requires that [the seller] shall have early warn-
ing.' "71 Although the seller does not need notification to realize
that the transaction is troublesome, he does not know that the buyer
intends to seek legal redress unless the buyer so notifies him. Thus,
the buyer must specifically inform the seller of his intent to seek
damages.
2. Continuing Use Cases
A court's choice of notification standard also affects the result
in cases where the buyer continued to use the goods after informing
the seller of his dissatisfaction with the transaction. In Lewis v. Mobil
Oil Corp.,72 Lewis purchased oil from a local Mobil dealer for use in
his hydraulic equipment after the dealer warranted that the oil was
fit for plaintiff's machine. The machine broke down several times,
leading Lewis to ask the dealer whether the oil was appropriate for
his machine. Lewis continued to purchase the same type of oil for
several months. The Eighth Circuit found that the buyer's com-
plaints were sufficient under the lenient standard to notify the
dealer that the transaction was troublesome and held Mobil liable
for damages. 73
In K&MJoint Venture v. Smith International, Inc., 74 the Sixth Cir-
cuit absolved the seller from liability under facts similar to those in
Mobil Oil. In K&M Joint Venture, K&M bought a tunnel boring
machine from Calweld. After K&M used the machine for a short
time, it began to malfunction. K&M complained about the
69 See id.
70 See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 152 (6th Cir. 1983);
Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 971-73 (5th Cir. 1976);
supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
71 Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 972 (quoting American Mfg. Co. v. United States
Shipping Bd. E.F. Corp., 7 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925)); see Roth Steel Prods., 705 F.2d at
152 (seller must have notice of breach to give him opportunity to cure defect or mini-
mize damages).
Courts employing the strict standard also reason that the statute requires notifica-
tion in late delivery cases by using the term "any breach." See, e.g., Roth Steel Prods., 705
F.2d at 152 (statute requires by express terms).
72 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971).
73 Id. at 509.
74 669 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1982).
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machine's "troubles," but continued to order repair and replace-
ment parts from Calweld. The Sixth Circuit held that K&M's com-
plaints did not meet section 2-607(3)(a)'s notification
requirement. 75 The court reasoned that K&M failed to give Calweld
unequivocal notice of its intent to seek legal redress for the
machine's difficulties by continuing to order and pay for parts with-
out protest.76 Although K&M's communications to Calweld were
sufficient to notify Calweld that the transaction was troublesome,
they did not meet the strict standard's additional requirement that
the buyer inform the seller of his intent to hold the buyer liable for
breach.
3. Single Complaint Cases
Courts applying different standards have also reached varying
results when evaluating the adequacy of single complaints. In
Chemco Industrial Applicators v. E.L duPont de Nemours and Co.,7 7
Chemco purchased herbicide from duPont that failed to achieve the
warranted kill rate. Chemco then complained that "the vegetation
was beginning to bud again."78 The court, relying on decisions ap-
plying the lenient standard,79 found that Chemco had given duPont
adequate notification of breach because its complaint informed du-
Pont that the transaction was "troublesome." 80 Thus, Chemco was
entitled to consequential damages.8 '
In Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, Inc.,82 however, the Maryland
Supreme Court found that a similar communication was not suffi-
cient notification. In Lynx, Lynx contracted to purchase hand gre-
nade fuses from O.P.I. When the fuses did not meet specifications,
Lynx sent O.P.I. a letter stating that its " 'cash flow has been se-
verely interrupted in the last 60 days, due in part to a quality prob-
lem at OPI.' "83 Because the complaint did not refer to a specific
group of fuses and failed to assert that O.P.I. had breached the war-
ranty, the court found it was "equivocal" and, therefore, inadequate
notification.8 4 Thus, the court required more detailed notification
75 Id. at 1115-16.
76 Id. at 1114-16.
77 366 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
78 Id. at 286.
79 Id. (citing Lewis v. Mobil Oil Co., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971); Boeing Airplane
Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964);Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills,
Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Mo. 1971)).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 273 Md. 1, 327 A.2d 502 (1974).
83 Id. at 18, 327 A.2d at 514 (quoting letter dated Mar. 5, 1973, from Lynx to
O.P.I.).
84 Id.
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than a lenient standard court, imposing a duty on the seller to spec-
ify the aspects of the transaction claimed to involve violations of
legal rights.
4. Summary
These examples demonstrate that a court's choice of notifica-
tion standard will affect the result in some cases.8 5 This potential
inconsistency undermines the Code's general policy of encouraging
uniformity of commercial law.8 6 To attempt to resolve the standard
of notification debate, this Note will evaluate the two standards of
notification against the policies which they are meant to serve.
II
A POLICY EVALUATION OF THE Two STANDARDS
Section 2-607(3)(a) embodies a broad fairness notion that re-
quires the buyer to warn the seller when he considers the seller to
have breached the agreement rather than permitting him to surprise
the seller with a lawsuit.8 7 Five specific goals underlie this broad
policy.
First, section 2-607(3)(a) should encourage good faith in com-
mercial transactions. The official comment to section 2-607 states
that "the rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat com-
mercial bad faith."' 8 Several courts have found that this goal lies at
the core of section 2-607(3)(a)'s notification requirement.8 9
85 Although the lenient standard requires only that the buyer notify the seller that
the transaction is troublesome, the strict standard imposes the additional requirement
that the buyer indicate his belief that the transaction involves a violation of legal rights.
Thus, a notification that would satisfy a strict standard court would automatically meet
the requirements of one using the lenient standard. See Speakman Co. v. Harper Buffing
Mach. Co., 583 F. Supp. 273, 277 n.4 (D. Del. 1984) (buyer's notification satisfied both
standards).
86 See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1977).
87 See 3 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 3, § 2-607:04, at 60-61.
88 U.C.C. § 2-607 official comment 4 (1977).
89 See K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1114 (6th Cir. 1982)
("The underpinning of UCC § 2-607 is a requirement of commercial good faith which is
met by a prompt notice that the buyer is claiming a breach has occurred."); Tj. Steven-
son & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 361 (5th Cir. 1980) (notification re-
quirement encourages "conduct within the bounds of commercial good faith");
Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 828 (6th Cir. 1978) (com-
mercial good faith mandates strict standard), cert denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); United Cal.
Bank v. Eastern Mountain Sports, 546 F. Supp. 945, 958-59 (D. Mass. 1982) (§ 2-
607(3) (a) intended to promote commercial good faith); Atlantic Bldg. Syss., Inc. v. Alley
Constr. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1414, 1420 (D. Mass. 1981) (meant to
"promote good faith in commercial relations"); Clow Corp. v. Metro Pipeline Co., 442
F. Supp. 583, 589 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (court must evaluate question of notification under
standard of good faith); Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91,
96 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (court must evaluate parties' course bf conduct under standard of
good faith).
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Section 2-607(3)(a)'s notification requirement should also en-
courage potential litigants to settle their disputes through negotia-
tion without resort to litigation. The Official Comment to section 2-
607 states that the buyer's notification should "open . . . th way
for normal settlement through negotiation." 90 A related goal of
section 2-607(3)(a) notification is that it should give the seller an
opportunity to cure the nonconforming tender, thus eliminating the
need for a lawsuit.9 '
Two of the notification requirement's underlying goals are re-
lated to litigation. The notification should give the seller an oppor-
tunity to prepare for litigation by investigating the buyer's claim.92
It should also give the seller repose from the possibility of litigation.
He should be able to assume that the buyer will not hold him liable
for breach absent notification.93
The present debatC94 focuses on the question of which standard
90 U.C.C. § 2-607 official comment 4 (1977). Courts frequently cite this policy as
supporting § 2-607(3)(a)'s notification requirement. See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon
Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 152 (6th Cir. 1983); see also T.J. Stevenson & Co., 629 F.2d at
360 (notification "must" encourage settlement); Standard Alliance Indus., 587 F.2d at 826
("express notice opens the way for settlement through negotiation between the par-
ties"); Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 972 (5th Cir. 1976)
(express notice stimulates settlement); United Cal. Bank, 546 F. Supp. at 958-59 (meant
to promote settlement); Atlantic Bldg. Syss., Inc. v. Alley Constr. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1414, 1420 (D. Mass. 1981) (meant to encourage "compromise");
Cotner v. International Harvester Co., 260 Ark. 885, 889, 545 S.W.2d 627, 630 (1977)
("[n]otice need only be sufficient ...to open the way for negotiation of a normal
settlement").
91 See Roth Steel Prods., 705 F.2d at 152; see also Standard Alliance Indus., 587 F.2d at
826 ("proper notice minimizes the possibility of prejudice to the seller by giving him
ample opportunity to cure the defect"); Cotner, 260 Ark. at 889, 545 S.W.2d at 630 (pur-
pose to give opportunity to repair); Hoffman's Double Bar Pine Nursery v. Fyke, 633
P.2d 516, 518 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (provides opportunity to cure); Paulson v. Olson
Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 525-26, 319 N.W.2d 855, 862 (1982) (opportunity to
repair "principle reason for requiring notice"); L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246
Ark. 463, 468, 438 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1969) (gives opportunity to cure). 4 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 3, § 2-607:4, at 120 (opportunity to cure);J. WHImT & R. SUMMERS, supra note
5, § 11-10, at 421-22.
92 See Standard Alliance Indus., 587 F.2d at 826; see also Roth Steel Prods., 705 F.2d at
152 (minimizes prejudice); Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 972 (allows "seller to investigate
the claim while the facts are fresh").
93 See Cotner, 260 Ark. at 889, 545 S.W.2d at 630 (some immunity against stale
claims); L.A. Green Seed Co., 246 Ark. at 468, 438 S.W.2d at 720 (same); Voboril v. Namco
Leisure World, Inc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 614, 615 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978);
4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-607:4, at 120; 3 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 3, § 2-
607:04, at 61;J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-10, at 422.
94 The commentators mirror the split among the courts between the strict and the
lenient standards. For example, Professors White and Summers advocate the lenient
standard but virtually ignore the cases where courts have employed the strict standard.
SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-10. Professor Clark also supports the
lenient standard but fails to provide any strong rationale for doing so. See Clark, supra
note 2, at 105-24. Clark's conclusions may be explained by his failure to isolate those
decisions applying § 2-607(3)(a) to transactions between merchants from those involv-
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better fulfills these goals. This Note will attempt to answer this
question by evaluating each of the standards against the five goals.
A. Good Faith
Although there is currently an extensive debate as to the proper
theoretical conceptualization of "good faith," 9-5 there appears to be
a consensus that any definition must be context-specific. Actions by
parties that a court might label good or bad faith vary according to
the situation.96 This Note, therefore, develops a definition of good
faith in the context of section 2-607(3)(a)'s notification requirement
by examining the requirement in light of the Code's good faith pro-
visions and the case law.
The Code establishes two interrelated good faith requirements
for merchants, one subjective and one objective.97 Section 1-
201(19) defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." 98 This section in conjunction with section
1-203, which states that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act im-
poses an obligation of good faith in its . . . enforcement," 99 creates
a subjective standard 100 that applies to all parties to a contract. If a
ing consumers. The cases applying the strict standard have uniformly stated that it ap-
plies only between commercial parties. See supra note 2; see also infra note 110 and
accompanying text (arguing that higher standard of good faith applies to merchants).
On the other hand, Ronald Anderson has noted the benefits of the strict standard.
He has not recognized, however, that the lenient standard may prove more advanta-
geous than the strict under some circumstances. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-
607:43, at 147.
95 The articles dealing with the general obligation of good faith include: Burton,
Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Burton, Breach of Contract]; Burton, Good Faith Performance of a
Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IowA L. REV. 1 (1981) (hereinaf-
ter cited as Burton, Good Faith Performance]; Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Com-
mercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963);
Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE LJ. 619; Summers, "Good
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sale Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L.
REV. 195 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Summers, "Good Faith']; Summers, The General Duty
of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Summers, General Duty].
96 Professor Summers, for example, argues that it is impossible to formulate a defi-
nition of good faith divorced from the context in which it is to be applied. See Summers,
"Good Faith, "supra note 95, at 195-267; Summers, General Duty, supra note 95, at 820.
Other commentators propose theories less dependent upon context than that advanced
by Professor Summers, but all would probably agree with Professor Farnsworth that
concepts of good faith are only slightly less varied than concepts of religious faith.
Farnsworth, supra note 95, at 667-68.
97 See 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 3, § 1-203:01, at 155-56 (§ 1-201(1)(a) creates
subjective standard whereas § 2-103 creates objective standard).
98 U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977). The official comment to this section does not define
the term "honesty." See generally U.C.C. § 1-201 official comment (1977).
99 U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).
100 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 6-3, at 218.
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party did not knowingly behave dishonestly, then he has not acted in
bad faith. 01 The Code establishes the objective standard of good
faith for merchants in section 2-103, which states that " '[g]ood
faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade."10 2 Thus, merchants must act with both subjective and objec-
tive good faith.10 3
A definitional problem arises in delineating the objective and
subjective standards of good faith because the Code does not define
"honesty" or "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade." In the absence of clear definitions, one can hypothesize
an almost infinite variety of forms of questionable behavior that the
drafters may have intended to prevent. 10 4 Thus, courts must im-
pose a theoretical framework upon the two concepts if they are to
have meaning within the specific context of section 2-607(3)(a).
Professor Robert Summers has developed one possible frame-
work.' 0 5 In his view, we can best conceptualize good faith require-
ments as "excluders."10 6 He suggests that by categorizing the types
of behavior that courts have excluded as bad faith in a particular
context, we can derive a functional definition of good faith for that
context.10 7 Thus, a functional definition of good faith in the context
101 Farnsworth, supra note 95, at 668.
102 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1977). The official comment to this section provides no
guidance as to how this term is to be interpreted. See generally U.C.C. § 2-103 official
comment (1977).
103 Farnsworth, supra note 95, at 75-78; see also 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 3, § 1-
203:01, at 155-56.
104 One commentator has suggested that the Code's drafters may have used the
word "honesty" to prevent only actual deceit or "to encourage commercial actors to
behave in the most reasonable manner under the circumstances, considering the inter-
ests of other parties." Gillette, supra note 95, at 622. The Code drafters themselves
disagreed as to the definition of "honesty." Id. at 625.
105 See generally Summers, General Duty, supra note 95, at 810-35.
106 Summers, "Good Faith, " supra note 95, at 195-267. Professor Summers's theory
has been criticized on the ground that it allows virtually any type of behavior to be classi-
fied as "bad faith." See Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 95, at 369-70 ("[t]he good
faith performance doctrine consequently appears as a license for the exercise ofjudicial
or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable or inconsistent applica-
tions") (footnotes omitted); Gillette, supra note 95, at 643; cf. Burton, Good Faith Perform-
ance, supra note 95, at 21 n.136. Professor Summers has responded to these critiques by
arguing that overextension cannot occur if a court using excluder analysis reasons by
analogy and in terms of the rationales presented by earlier cases when it determines
whether certain behavior indicates bad faith. Summers, General Duty, supra note 95, at
823-34.
Whether or not Summers's model should be the means by which a court chooses to
define good faith, it provides a workable method for determining what courts actually
define good faith to be. By looking at the types of behavior courts exclude in the name
of good faith, one can determine what courts consider good faith to be in that context.
107 Summers, "Good Faith, "supra note 95, at 220; see also Summers, General Duty, supra
note 95, at 822. Professor Summers would not limit the definition of good faith to
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
of section 2-607(3)(a) can be derived by identifying the types of be-
havior that have already been excluded.
Courts applying the good faith requirement to evaluate the ade-
quacy of notification usually note that the Code requires commercial
actors to behave in accordance with a subjective standard of good
faith,' 0 8 but they evaluate the notification only against the objective
standard of good faith. They generally do not need to use the sub-
jective standard because section 2-607(3)(a) cases seldom involve
actual dishonesty.' 09 Consequently, courts cite the objective stan-
dard as the principal basis for holding merchants to a stricter stan-
dard of notice than consumers. 110
To fulfill the objective good faith requirement in the context of
section 2-607(3)(a), 111 the buyer must not act in a manner which
leads the seller to believe that the contract has been properly per-
formed when the buyer actually intends to institute a lawsuit. In
Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 112 the court of appeals
remanded with instructions for the jury to resolve the liability issue
by determining whether Eastern's behavior, in the context of busi-
ness practices in the aviation industry, may have led the seller,
Douglas, to believe no contract dispute existed when, in fact, one
did.' 13 Even though the notice of breach might irreparably damage
"honesty in fact" or "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." See
generally Summers, "Good Faith, " supra note 95, at 195-267; Summers, General Duty, supra
note 95, at 810-35.
108 See infra note 110; see also U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 1-201(19) (1977).
109 Another reason courts may not use the subjective standard is that the objective
standard imposes a higher duty of good faith than the subjective standard. Thus, once a
court has determined that a merchant has met or failed to meet the objective standard, it
has resolved the good faith issue and need not move on to consider the subjective
standard.
I 10 See K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (6th Cir.
1982); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 827 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
532 F.2d 957, 977 (5th Cir. 1976); Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F.
Supp. 91, 96 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
111 See, e.g., K & MJoint Venture, 669 F.2d at 1114 (order of and payment for repair
and replacement parts "is inconsistent with the claim that K & M considered Calweld
liable); Clow Corp. v. Metro Pipeline Co., 442 F. Supp. 583, 588-90 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(failure of buyer to provide notification in order to protect business relationship misled
seller); Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc., 436 F. Supp. at 97 (favorable buyer reports misled seller
even though buyer complained on two occasions); cf. TJ. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193
Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 364 (5th Cir. 1980) (buyer behaved in good faith by
promptly giving notice of breach and discontinuing business relationship); Donnell &
Mudge, Inc. v. Bonita Leather Fashions, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 699, 700-
01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) ("[buyer's] undeviating course of conduct in continuing. . . to
make payment after payment, unconditionally, cannot be construed as anything other
than 'a waiver and estoppel to make the claims with respect to the alleged defects' ")
(citation omitted).
112 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
113 See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
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an ongoing and essential business relationship, the court refused to
relax the application of the good faith requirement to tolerate mis-
leading behavior.'14
Other courts cite the good faith requirement to support their
application of the strict standard, but they have not used it to char-
acterize a specific type of behavior as indicative of bad faith. In-
stead, these courts have used the objective standard of good faith as
a rationale for imposing a higher standard of notification on
merchants than on consumers. 1 5 Thus, the objective good faith re-
quirement in the context of section 2-607(3)(a) means the absence
of activities by the buyer that mislead the seller regarding the
buyer's intention to institute a lawsuit.'16
Given this contextual definition of good faith, it is necessary to
determine which standard better prevents misleading behavior.
Certainly the strict standard prevents misleading behavior by forc-
ing the buyer to clearly and unambiguously inform the seller that
the buyer believes there has been a breach of contract. Moreover,
most courts applying the strict standard further protect against mis-
leading behavior by examining the entire course of communications
between the parties." 17
In contrast, notification that the transaction is "troublesome"
does not clearly convey the existence of a breach. Courts using the
lenient standard also do not stress the need to examine the entire
course of communications between the parties, but base their deci-
sions on individual complaints considered in isolation from other
communications between buyer and seller. Many of these courts
find virtually any individual complaint adequate to constitute notifi-
cation under section 2-607(3)(a).118 Thus, to the extent that lenient
standard courts limit their scrutiny of the transaction and do not
require the buyer to clearly convey the existence of a breach, the
strict standard is a superior method for preventing misleading be-
havior. A closer examination suggests, however, that the strict stan-
dard is not necessarily superior to the lenient standard in
preventing misleading behavior. A court applying the lenient stan-
114 Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 979 n.62 (5th Cir. 1976). Other courts have agreed
with this view. See, e.g., Clow Corp., 442 F. Supp. at 589-90 (requiring notification even
though failure to give notification was a necessary business decision).
115 See, e.g., Standard Alliance Indus., 587 F.2d at 828 (stating that good faith mandates
strict standard and places greater burden of notification on merchants than on consum-
ers); Atlantic Bldg. Syss., Inc. v. Alley Constr. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1414, 1420 (D. Mass. 1981) (same).
116 Although courts currently only characterize misleading behavior as indicative of
bad faith in the context of § 2-607(3)(a), the good faith concept is flexible and the scope
of its application may expand in the future.
117 See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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dard could use the good faith requirement as a policing doctrine.
After determining that a particular communication informed the
seller that the transaction was troublesome, the court could under-
take an independent examination of the entire course of communi-
cations between the parties to determine whether the buyer had
misled the seller. Thus, courts using the lenient standard could pre-
vent misleading behavior as well as courts using the strict standard.
B. Settlement
Although the theory of legal bargaining is primitive at pres-
ent," t9 it does support the conclusion that neither standard of notifi-
cation is superior in encouraging settlement. In a bargaining
situation, a threat that constitutes adequate notification under the
strict standard 20 (e.g., "I consider you to be in breach.") may be
conducive to settlement, 21 but it may result in increased levels of
conflict by causing the other party to take a similarly inflexible posi-
tion. 122 A more flexible complaint that would only comply with the
lenient standard of notification (e.g., "Hey, there's some trouble
with this transaction.") might create a cooperative atmosphere in
which the parties resolve the difficulty to their mutual benefit.' 23 If
1 9 As one analyst has noted, "[a]lthough negotiation has been studied extensively
by game theorists, economists and social psychologists, legal scholars have not ex-
amined the process of bargaining." Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation, Process,
Strategy, and Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. REv. 69, 70 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
120 According to Professor Lowenthal, "[a] threat is a communication from one
party to a second indicating that, if the second party does not settle according to terms
acceptable to the first party, the first party will take action unpleasant or detrimental to
the second party." Id. at 86. An explicit claim that another party has breached a con-
tract, with its implied threat of litigation, meets this definition.
121 A highly credible threat, for example, increases the chances of settlement. See id.
at 86-88.
122 See Deutsch, Conflicts: Productive and Destructive, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 159, 164 (D.W. Johnson ed. 1973) ("Threat induces defensiveness and
reduces the tolerance of ambiguity as well as openness to the new and unfamiliar; exces-
sive tension leads to a primitivization and stereotyping of thought processes."); see also
Lowenthal, supra note 119, at 88 ("[T]he use of threat[s] strengthens the competitive
interests of the party being threatened, and thus, increases the risk of retaliation, rigid-
ity, and costly escalation.") (footnotes omitted); cf. Hamner, Effects of Bargaining Strategy
and Pressure to Reach Agreement in a Stalemated Negotiation, 30 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. Psy-
CHOLOGY 458, 464 (1974) ("These results suggest that. . . a tough strategy reduces the
probability of reaching an agreement . ). Intuitively, one would expect threats of
litigation to result in hostile reactions.
123 See Lowenthal, supra note 119, at 88-89; see also Deutsch, supra note 122, at 166
(process of negotiation factor in determining outcome); cf. Hamner, supra note 134, at
465 ("subjects who faced a soft-strategy opponent responded with a higher concession
rate").
In general, a cooperative bargaining process stimulates settlement better than a
competitive process because it encourages open and honest communications between
the parties, aids in the "recognition of the legitimacy" of the other party's position, and
creates a friendly atmosphere between the parties. Deutsch, supra note 122, at 165.
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the buyer makes the complaint too flexible by omitting information
sufficient to communicate his dissatisfaction and readiness to liti-
gate, it may still satisfy the lenient standard, without giving the seller
incentive to settle. 124 Therefore, neither standard is always better at
promoting settlement.1 25
C. Opportunity to Repair
Neither standard is clearly superior in providing the seller with
an opportunity to repair. Notification that is sufficient under either
standard informs the seller of the need for repair. But the strict
standard makes the imminence of a breach of contract suit manifest
and thereby provides the seller with an incentive to cure the prob-
lem. Thus, the strict standard may be superior.
D. Opportunity to Prepare for Litigation
The strict standard gives the seller a greater opportunity to pre-
pare for litigation than the lenient standard. A mere claim that the
transaction is troublesome is equivocal1 26 and does not necessarily
inform the seller of a need to prepare for litigation. Notification from
the buyer that he considers the seller legally to be in breach clearly
provides the seller with notice of the necessity for prelitigation
preparation.
E. Repose from the Possibility of Litigation
The strict standard of notification better serves the goal of giv-
ing the seller repose from the possibility of litigation than the leni-
ent standard. Under the strict standard, the seller knows that he
does not face a legal claim unless the buyer specifically notifies him
124 Conflict can have the beneficial effect of stimulating parties to attempt settlement
only if the communication from the dissatisfied party makes the satisfied party suffi-
ciently aware of the difficulties in the relationship to cause him to reevaluate his posi-
tion. See Deutsch, supra note 122, at 163. Thus, if a buyer fails to give the seller any
indication of serious difficulty in the transaction, the seller will have no reason to
reevaluate his position and the notice will not encourage settlement.
125 Ideally, notification must inform the buyer of a problem, but should not be so
severe as to deter negotiations. The superiority of either the collaborative or competi-
tive bargaining model at achieving settlement depends upon numerous factors such as
the flow of information between the parties, the mode of communication, the payoff
structure of the negotiation (e.g., zero-sum or nonzero-sum), the size of the negotiation
agenda, the normative aspects of the negotiation, the continuing relationship of the par-
ties apart from the negotiation, and the personality and values of the negotiators. See
Lowenthal, supra note 119, at 69-114; see also Deutsch, supra note 122, at 166-67 (factors
determining success or failure of a bargaining strategy: (1) process, (2) prior relation-
ship of parties, (3) characteristics of parties, and (4) role of third parties); Hamner, supra
note 122, at 464 (chance of settlement increased with increased extrinsic pressure for
each settlement).
126 See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 152 (6th Cir. 1983).
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of the asserted contract breach. Because of the equivocal nature of
a mere claim that the transaction is troublesome, the lenient stan-
dard fails to provide the seller similar repose from the possibility of
litigation.
III
A PROCESS FOR ANALYZING THE ADEQUACY OF
NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 2-60 7 (3)(A)
A. Theoretical Development
A method for analyzing the adequacy of notification under sec-
tion 2-607(3)(a) is necessary for two reasons. First, neither standard
is consistently superior in promoting the goals of section 2-
607(3)(a).' 27 Second, because section 2-607(3)(a) does not require
the buyer to notify the seller by a single act, a court must have some
method to analyze several disparate acts of communication.
1 28
The analysis for determining the adequacy of a buyer's notifica-
tion should reflect the goals of section 2-607(3)(a)'s notification re-
quirement. A mechanical application of either the strict or the
lenient standard would not, however, be the best method of attain-
ing these goals. Rather, courts should evaluate the parties' conduct
against each of the goals of notification to determine the extent to
which they have been met.' 29 At times the results of these evalua-
tions will be inconsistent. For example, an explicit notification of
breach might be necessary to give the seller an opportunity to repair
but a guarded notification may be more helpful in facilitating a set-
tlement.'3 0 Courts will have to make value judgments between
goals in these cases.
In resolving conflicts between the policies, the goal of encour-
aging good faith merits top priority because the Code expressly im-
poses this obligation.1 3' The goal of encouraging settlement ranks
127 See supra section II.
128 TJ. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 359 (5th Cir. 1980).
129 Several commentators have recognized the importance of the policies behind
§ 2-607(3)(a) but have not used them to propose a process for evaluating notice under
§ 2-607(3)(a). Instead, these commentators have advocated one standard or the other.
They have also failed to recognize all five of the policies underlying the notification
requirement. See generally 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-607:4, at 119-20 (purpose to
allow cure, preparation for litigation, and protection against stale claims; advocating
strict standard); J. WHiTE &R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-10, at 421-23, 425 (opportu-
nity to cure, preparation for litigation, repose from the possibility of litigation; advocat-
ing lenient standard); Clark, supra note 2, at 110-11 (encourage settlements, prepare for
litigation, opportunity to cure, protection from stale claims; advocating lenient stan-
dard). For an interesting discussion of the policies behind the notification requirement
as they relate to strict liability in tort and to sales, see generally Phillips, supra note 2.
130 See infra section III.B (giving examples).
131 U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 1-201(19), 2-103 (1977) (Code good faith sections).
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second because comment four to section 2-607(3)(a) mentions this
as a justification for the notification requirement.1 32 The goal of
providing an opportunity for the seller to cure ranks third because
of its role in reducing the likelihood of litigation. The opportunity
to prepare for litigation takes fourth place because, unlike the first
three goals, it does not encourage the search for alternatives to a
lawsuit. The lowest priority goes to the goal of giving sellers repose
from the possibility of litigation because the Code, in section 2-725,
imposes a statute of limitations that more directly addresses the is-
sue of eliminating stale claims.' 3 3 Because the importance of these
goals depends upon the fact pattern of a given case, however, courts
should not rigidly adhere to this priority system.' 3 4
B. Examples of the Process in Action
Several examples should clarify this process of analyzing the ad-
equacy of notification under section 2-607(3)(a). These examples
illustrate that the evaluation of conduct against these five separate
goals may produce conflicting results. They also make clear the de-
sirability of using this process rather than mechanically applying the
strict or lenient standard. This Note will proceed by analyzing two
polar cases: one presenting a clearly acceptable example of notifica-
tion, the other a clearly unacceptable example. The Note will then
examine several intermediate cases.
1. Polar Case: Notification Clearly Meeting Section 2-607(3)(a)'s
Notification Requirement
Buyer (B) contracted to purchase wheat from Seller (S). S de-
livered the wheat to B in a timely manner, but it was infested with
vermin. Upon discovering S's imperfect tender, B sent S the fol-
lowing letter:
I have just received the wheat I ordered from you. Upon de-
livery I discovered that the wheat was infested with vermin. Be-
cause of your imperfect tender I will not accept any future
deliveries of your wheat until further notice. I would like to ar-
range a time to negotiate a settlement in this matter, but if I can't
reach a compromise with you I will take legal recourse. 135
132 Id. § 2-607(3)(a) official comment 4 (notice meant to encourage settlement).
133 See U.C.C. § 2-725 (1977). To the extent that the courts advocating the strict
standard have analyzed the facts in terms of these policies, they are examples of this
process.
134 Courts should not apply any priority scheme too rigidly. In some cases, the pos-
sibility of settlement may be negligible. Under these circumstances the policy of giving
the seller an opportunity to prepare for litigation should take second place.
135 The facts of this hypothetical follow loosely those of T.J. Stevenson & Co. v.
81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1980).
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B's conduct in this situation meets all the goals of section 2-
607(3)(a)'s notice requirement. First, B behaved in good faith. In
the context of section 2-607(3) (a), misleading behavior is indicative
of bad faith. 136 In this hypothetical B did not mislead S. He clearly
indicated that he considered S's tender to be nonconforming, that
he was considering legal action, and that he refused to accept fur-
ther deliveries until the problem was solved. Therefore, B's notice
met the standard of good faith imposed by section 2-607(3)(a).
B's letter was sufficient to notify S of the need to settle the dis-
pute. A buyer's complaint should be strong enough to notify the
seller that he must settle the dispute or face litigation. It should not
be so threatening, however, that it elicits an antagonistic response
from the seller.' 37 B adequately notified S because he indicated
that litigation was possible, but also communicated his desire to
reach a compromise through negotiations.
The letter also gave the seller an opportunity to cure the defect.
B informed S of the need to cure by telling him of the nonconform-
ing tender. He provided S with an opportunity to cure by offering
to participate in settlement negotiations.' 38
B's letter gave S the opportunity to prepare for trial by inform-
ing him that there would be litigation if negotiations failed.' 39 The
notice also gave S a certain repose from the possibility of litigation
by relieving him of uncertainty as to B 's intent.140 In summary, B 's
letter met all of the goals underlying section 2-607(3) (a) and, there-
fore, constituted adequate notification of breach.
2. Polar Case: Notification Clearly Insufficient Under Section 2-
607(3)(a) 's Notification Requirement
B purchased a machine from S, but it malfunctioned shortly
after B accepted delivery. B asked S to repair several specified de-
fects. S repaired these problems and inspected the machine in
search of any latent defects. The machine subsequently malfunc-
tioned for reasons other than those leading to B's earlier request for
repairs. B did not tell S about the new difficulties and continued to
order replacement parts for the machine from S. In fact, B told S
that he was satisfied with the machine in order to protect his ongo-
ing business relationship with S. B then brought suit against S for
breach of warranty, claiming that the earlier requests for service had
satisfied section 2-607(3)(a).
136 See supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
137 See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
138 See supra section II.C.
139 See supra section II.D.
140 See supra section II.E.
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B's behavior, taken as a whole, constituted bad faith. B led S to
believe the contract had been satisfactorily performed, when B actu-
ally intended to sue S for breach. 141 Although the machine mal-
functioned after the initial repairs, B continued to deal with S and
expressed satisfaction with S's efforts. In essence, B encouraged S
to believe that his repairs had alleviated the troublesome aspects of
the transaction. Thus B acted in bad faith and a court relying on the
priority scheme set forth earlier should bar his breach of warranty
action. 142
B's communication failed to inform S of the need to pursue
settlement.' 43 B expressed satisfaction with the machine after the
repairs. Thus, S could reasonably believe that its repairs had solved
any problems and that there was no need to pursue settlement
negotiations.
S did not have an opportunity to repair the machine before B
filed suit.' 44 B notified S of the problems with the transaction
before the difficulties that led to the suit developed. B's communi-
cation did not even put S on inquiry notice because B had ex-
pressed satisfaction with S's actions after S had already repaired
and inspected the machine. Thus, B failed to give S notification of
the need to cure the defects in order to avoid litigation.
Similarly, B's actions denied S the opportunity to prepare for
litigation prior to the filing of the complaint.145 S had no reason to
believe that B was planning to sue and thus had no incentive to in-
vestigate the transaction to prepare for litigation.
Finally, judicial acceptance of B 's contention that his earlier re-
quest for repairs was satisfactory notification of breach would con-
tradict section 2-607(3)(a)'s goal of providing the seller repose from
the possibility of litigation.' 46 B's request was made before he knew
of the defects upon which he based his claim. B never indicated that
he was contemplating legal action. If a court accepted B's conten-
tion, virtually any claim would satisfy section 2-607(3)(a). Sellers
would face the prospect that all buyer complaints would be ade-
quate notification of breach, even if the action was based on defects
totally unrelated to those contained in the buyer's communication.
Because the notification failed to meet any goals of the notification
requirement, section 2-607(3)(a) bars B's action for breach of
warranty.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 111-16. See generally section II.A (analyzing
policy of encouraging commercial good faith).
142 See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
143 See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
144 See supra section II.C.
145 See supra section II.D.
146 See supra section II.E.
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3. Intermediate Cases
Many fact patterns will not be as easy to analyze as the two po-
lar cases. Three intermediate hypotheticals in which only some of
the goals are met illustrate that the results of the analysis may con-
flict and how a court should resolve these conflicts. The first two
cases in this series are examples of inadequate notification under
section 2-607(3)(a); the last case sets forth facts meeting the sec-
tion's notification requirement.
a. Good Faith Primary. Buyer (B) contracted with Seller (S) to
purchase airplanes. The contract specified that S would deliver the
planes by March 31, 1982. S had delivered only half the required
number of planes by August 6, 1982. On April 15, 1982, B sent S
the following telegram: "I am still awaiting delivery of planes. You
should have delivered them on March 31. I think you are in breach
of our contract." A week later, however, B telephoned S and said:
"You know, S, it turns out we need more planes than we thought.
Would you consider a contract for ten more?" Four days later B, in
an effort to protect the ongoing business relationship, told S: "We
really don't plan to sue you for the delay in delivering our planes.
We understand that things have been rough in the airplane industry
lately. We only were trying to hurry you up by threatening to sue.
We weren't serious."
Two weeks after B's last communication with S, B brought suit
against S for breach of contract. In his pleadings, B alleged that his
telegram to S satisfied section 2-607(3)(a).147
If a court analyzed B's telegram in isolation, it would find that
the goals of encouraging settlement, providing an opportunity to
cure, and providing an opportunity to prepare for litigation were
met.148 The telegram indicated the nature of the nonconforming
tender and informed S of B's intent to litigate unless the defect was
remedied or a satisfactory settlement was reached. Thus, a court
looking only at this single incident of notice, as many.lenient stan-
dard courts do, would find that B's telegram satisfied section 2-
607(3)(a)'s notification requirement.
A court examining the entire relationship between the parties,
however, would find B's behavior to be misleading and indicative of
bad faith. According to the hierarchy of notification goals, encour-
aging good faith takes precedence over encouraging settlement
when determining whether to bar the buyer's action for breach of
warranty.
147 The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based on Eastern Air Lines v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
148 See supra sections 1IB.-E.
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A court may police against commercial bad faith under section
2-607(3)(a) in two ways. First, it may proceed by examining a single
incident of notification (e.g., B's telegram) to determine whether it
encourages settlement, gives the seller an opportunity to cure and
an opportunity to prepare for litigation, and gives the seller repose
from the possibility of litigation. If the court finds that the single
incident of notification meets these goals, it can then examine the
parties' entire relationship to determine whether the buyer misled
the seller. 149
Alternatively, the court may first examine the parties' relation-
ship for evidence of the buyer's misleading behavior and proceed to
evaluate specific incidents of notification only after concluding that
the buyer did not mislead the seller. The two methods produce the
same result. 150
In this case, the two telephone calls constitute misleading be-
havior because they led S to believe that the telegram was not notifi-
cation of breach but was merely a prod to speed up delivery of the
planes. B's additional order reinforced S's perception that B did
not consider the transaction to involve a breach. B's telegram taken
alone satisfied section 2-607(3) (a), but B's entire course of behavior
negates this conclusion. Thus, the notification fails to meet section
2-607(3)(a)'s requirements.
b. Settlement Primary. B purchased a machine from S. Shortly
after taking delivery of the machine, B called S and said: "I'm hav-
ing some trouble with the machine but it is working." B did not call
S again and filed suit for breach of warranty three weeks later.
B did not lead S to believe that he did not consider S to be in
breach of contract. He never indicated that he was satisfied with the
transaction nor did he continue to deal with S and thereby imply to
S that he was satisfied with the transaction. Thus B's phone call met
section 2-607(3)(a)'s standard of good faith. 15 1
B's message did not, however, stimulate settlement. 5 2 His ac-
tion was equivocal because it did not inform the seller of the source
of the machine's "troubles." S could reasonably infer that the
machine was working fine but B was having trouble learning to op-
erate it, or that there were some problems with the machine that B
was willing to tolerate. In any case, B's message failed to give S any
incentive to settle and thus failed to meet section 6-607(3)(a)'s goal
of encouraging settlement, For the same reasons, B's call did not
149 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
150 See id.
151 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
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give S an opportunity to cure the defect or to prepare for litigation,
and did not give the seller repose from the possibility of litiga-
tion. 153 Therefore, section 2-607(3)(a) bars B's suit for breach of
warranty against S.
c. Encouraging Settlement Takes Priority over the Opportunity to Pre-
pare for Litigation and Repose from Possibility of Litigation. B had an
ongoing agreement to purchase widgets from S. B knew that S had
a history of refusing to negotiate settlements with buyers who
threatened suit. In fact, S had a policy of litigating whenever buyers
threatened to bring a suit, reasoning that such a policy would dis-
courage buyers from making such threats. After dealing with S for
several years, B received a batch of nonconforming widgets from S.
B was faced with a dilemma. He could expressly inform S of the
breach and fulfill the literal terms of section 2-607(3)(a) but give up
any hope for settlement. Alternatively, he could ask S to fix the
problem but fail to give S an opportunity to prepare for litigation or
repose from the possibility of litigation by not indicating that he
contemplated legal action. If B followed the first course of action, it
would clearly meet section 2-607(3)(a)'s notification requirement.
By its terms, the section does not forbid the buyer from giving an
overly antagonistic notice of reach.' 54 But B wanted to settle the
problem without court action and thus sent S the following letter:
"I have just received order no. 2047. The widgets in this lot are not
up to your usually high standard of quality. Please contact me so we
can agree on a way to clear up this problem." B's letter fulfills sec-
tion 2-607(3)(a)'s notification requirement.
Normally this letter would not encourage settlement because it
does not provide the seller with an incentive to settle in order to
avoid litigation.' 55 In fact, B's message does not even indicate that
S made a nonconforming tender, saying only that the widgets in the
order had fallen below the quality of those usually delivered. Simi-
larly, B's letter neither informs S of a need to prepare for litigation
nor relieves S of his concern that minor complaints may constitute
notice of breach.' 56 In this situation, however, B's letter was neces-
sary to encourage settlement because of S's policy of litigating
whenever a buyer threatened suit. Section 2-607(3)(a) gives high
priority to the goal of encouraging settlement and a court should
not discourage such attempts by mechanically applying a standard
for determining the adequacy of notification. Here B in good faith
153 See supra sections II.C.-E.
154 See generally U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1977).
155 See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
156 See supra sections II.D.-E.
[Vol. 70:525
NOTIFICATION OF BREACH
took the only course available to encourage an out of court settle-
ment. By so doing, he complied with section 2-607(3)(a).
4. Summary
The hypotheticals illustrate three important concepts. -First,
section 2-607(3)(a) cases exist in a continuum of more or less satis-
factory examples of notification. To place a case on this continuum,
courts must analyze the facts in terms of section 2-607(3)(a)'s goals.
They should not mechanically apply the strict or lenient standard.
Second, the goals are analytically distinct and the results of conduct
evaluations may conflict. If a conflict arises, a court must make
value judgments concerning the relative importance of these goals.
Finally, the hypotheticals illustrate the importance of examining the
parties' entire relationship closely. A court concentrating on only
isolated incidents of communication may not be able to determine
the true nature of the transaction.
With these three points in mind, courts should approach issues
arising under section 2-607(3)(a) from a policy perspective.1 57 In
doing so they will resolve the present disagreement in this area of
the commercial law and increase the chances of arriving at a just
result.
IV
CONCLUSION
At present courts disagree as to the standard of notice required
by section 2-607(3)(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code. Some
courts, relying on language in official comment four to section 2-
607(3)(a), merely require a buyer to give the seller notice "that the
transaction is still troublesome and must be watched", 158 in order to
preserve the buyer's right to bring an action after acceptance of
goods under section 2-607. Other courts require the buyer to spe-
cifically notify the seller that the buyer considers the seller to be in
breach of the contract, in order to preserve the buyer's remedies.
Because neither standard is clearly superior in furthering the poli-
cies underlying section 2-607(3)(a)'s notice requirement, courts
should not mechanically apply either the lenient or strict standard.
157 For a decision seeming to follow the spirit of this prescription, see United Cal.
Bank v. Eastern Mountain Sports, 546 F. Supp. 945, 959 (D. Mass. 1982) ("The advance-
ment of good faith in commercial dealings is best served by following a course of action
designed to elicit reasonable discussion aimed at working out a mutually acceptable so-
lution between the parties."). See alo Speakman Co. v. Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 583 F.
Supp. 273, 277 & n.4 (D. Del. 1984) ("So long as notice is sufficient to satisfy these
policies [underlying § 2-607(3) (a)], a claim for breach of contract or warranty should not
be barred under section 2-607.")
158 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) official comment 4 (1977) (citations omitted).
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Rather, courts should evaluate the facts of each case in light of the
goals behind the notice requirement to determine whether the
buyer has given adequate notice of breach.
George Frank Hammond
